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Abstract
Is there a trade-oﬀ between people's preference for income equality and in-
come mobility? Testing for the existence of such a trade-oﬀ is diﬃcult because
mobility is a multifaceted concept. We analyse results from a questionnaire
experiment based on simple precise concepts of income inequality and in-
come mobility. We ﬁnd no direct trade-oﬀ in preference between mobility
and equality, but an indirect trade-oﬀ, applying when more income mobility
can only be obtained at the expense of some income inequality. Mobility
preference  but not equality preference  appears to be driven by personal
experience of mobility.
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1 Introduction
Do people value income mobility along with other apparently desirable eco-
nomic objectives? In contrast to the extensive literature on simple distribu-
tional comparisons in connection with inequality, poverty and social welfare,
the welfare-economic basis underlying preferences for income mobility is not
clear. It may be that there is a connection between mobility and equality of
opportunity and that greater income mobility is thus socially desirable, but
there is no single accepted formal argument to establish this. Nevertheless
there is, perhaps, an accepted consensus that greater mobility in society is
a good thing and so it makes sense to see whether people do indeed value
this good thing in the way that we suppose that they do. The contribution of
this paper is to suggest a way of characterising a trade-oﬀ between mobility
and other apparently desirable social objectives and of looking at the factors
which may predispose people to value mobility particularly highly.
Income mobility is a topic that crosses disciplines which partly explains
the diﬃculty of ﬁnding a way of appraising a unique formal notion of mo-
bility (Van de gaer et al. 2001, Formby et al. 2004). While sociologists and
statisticians are especially interested in measuring mobility in the abstract,1
economists are often interested in judging and evaluating income mobility
from a welfare-based perspective. In the theoretical literature this is done
either using explicit welfare functions or axiomatic approaches.2 Our analy-
sis has both normative and empirical content: it is based on a questionnaire
study and is rooted in empirical social choice.3 Its premise is that in the
debates about principles of social justice it is important to engage with the
way people actually think, both in order to avoid becoming hostage of scien-
tiﬁc conventions and because it is real people who bear the consequences of
decisions based on untested normative principles.4
1See for example Prais (1955), Rogoﬀ (1953), Duncan (1966), Goldthorpe (1980), Con-
lisk (1990).
2For welfare approaches see Atkinson (1981), Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982);
Chakravarty et al. (1985), Dardanoni (1993), Gottschalk and Spolaore (2002), Markandya
(1982); for axiomatic approaches see Shorrocks (1978), Cowell (1985), Cowell and Flachaire
(2011), Fields and Ok (1996), Mitra and Ok 1998, D'Agostino and Dardanoni (2009).
3See Gaertner and Schokkaert (2012), the seminal articles by Yaari and Bar-Hillel
(1984), Amiel and Cowell (1992) and the overviews in Amiel (1999) and Konow (2003).
4What matters in the questionnaire studies are people's ethical values, and not their
behaviour determined by personal and strategic evaluations. The absence of strategic and
personal motivations is what characterises the questionnaire method from the experimental
approach, also recently applied with diﬀerent objectives to questions related to distributive
justice  see Krawczyk (2010), Cappelen et al. (2010), for issues related to those treated
here. The two approaches are complementary.
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Can we ﬁnd a way of eliciting people's preferences for intergenerational
mobility? We suggest that it is appropriate to try to ﬁnd a context-free way
of representing the problem similar to the way that is done when making in-
equality or welfare comparisons using principles of distributional dominance.
However, we need to go carefully here because, although multidimensional
versions of dominance principles are available, it is not clear that these formal
results are particularly illuminating in terms of what is commonly understood
by income mobility. Furthermore, if we want to understand whether people
value mobility it is useful to have a representation of the problem that allows
both for clear mobility comparisons and for a trade-oﬀ against some other
social goal. In our questionnaire we focus on intergenerational income mo-
bility and we suggest a method of investigating a possible trade-oﬀ between
mobility and equality in people's preferences.
Intergenerational mobility is also a central issue in distributive justice
debates: how should one account for accidents of birth when seeking a just
distribution of ﬁnal outcomes? Some argue that only income inequalities
arising from diﬀerences at birth should be a cause for concern. In our ap-
proach we contrast the liberal position that all forms of income diﬀerences
are equally unjustiﬁed unless they go the advantage of the least well-oﬀ peo-
ple and also with intermediate positions. We identify meritocratic views that
allow income inequality to the extent that it serves the purpose of rewarding
talent or desert: this position does not necessarily imply an ethical substitu-
tion between income mobility and income equality.5
There is also a recent wave of empirical studies that analyse the way pref-
erences for policies that equalize incomes are aﬀected by factors related to mo-
bility6 and that are associated with the theoretical approaches in Hirschman
(1973), Piketty (1995), Benabou and Ok (2001). This literature typically
ﬁnds that support for an equalization of income expressed in social surveys
is aﬀected by belief in one's own prospects of upwards mobility and by trust
in factors which are generally thought to promote mobility. However, the
results are not so useful in understanding the values which individuals place
on mobility and on equality per se. So part of our analysis focuses on the
possible eﬀect of respondents' personal characteristics on their abstract pref-
erences for mobility and for equality.
5Underlying the liberal position is the view that identiﬁes income mobility with equal-
ity of opportunity (Stokey 1998, p.161). However equality of opportunity has a variety
of interpretations: it is used in the egalitarian literature to describe a situation of proce-
dural equality of opportunity (Rawls 1971) or to represent the ideal of an egalitarianism
tempered by responsibility (Dworkin 1981, Roemer 1998).
6See for example, Fong (2001), Corneo and Grüner (2002), Alesina and La Ferrara
(2005), Isaksson and Lindskog (2009).
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The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the main theoretical
ideas analysed in the questionnaire. Section 3 explains the approach adopted
to elicit people's views and perceptions of mobility and describes the samples
used for our study. Sections 4 and 5 examine the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Welfare economics, income distribution and
mobility
Our approach involves hypothetical questions and judgments expressed from
the standpoint of an uninvolved external observer.7 Using hypothetical ques-
tions without personal involvement encourages coherent thinking about social
mobility comparisons in the abstract, which by their multidimensional nature
are intrinsically more problematic than pure inequality comparisons.
Take a standard framework in which there are n dynasties in society, each
of which is present for one of two periods: the parent of dynasty i is alive
in period 0 and the child of dynasty i in period 1. The whole structure of
the society can be represented by the joint distribution H(P,C) of the pair
of random variables P and C for, respectively, parents' and children's in-
comes. In particular, the joint distribution H(P,C) contains all the relevant
information to study inequality within each generation, mobility between
generations and the interplay between the two.
Assume that within each generation income can take only two values:
Pl and Ph for parents' low and high incomes, respectively; Cl and Ch for
children's incomes. The joint distribution for this simple case can then be
represented by the 2 × 2 mobility table in Figure 1.8 Here nij denotes the
number of dynasties with parents belonging to category i and children to
category j, with
∑
i
∑
j nij = n and i, j = l, h. Dividing nij by n gives the
relative frequency of children in class j with parents in class i, an estimate
of the probability of transition from class i to class j. The row and column
sums ni. and n.j give the absolute frequencies of the marginal distributions
of parents' and children's incomes, respectively.
The marginal distributions of parents and children provide information of
a static nature: they represent the basis for analysing inequality and welfare
within generations. Take Figure 2 where parents have the same marginal
7This is consistent with David Hume and Adam Smith who argued that the sympathy
and impartiality required to discuss distributive justice can only be obtained by putting
some distance between the social decision maker and the persons whose welfare is to be
evaluated (Bernasconi 2002, Bosmans and Schokkaert 2004, Amiel et al. 2009).
8This representation of a mobility table enables the marginal distributions to be seen
easily.
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Cl Ch Parents' margins
Pl nll nlh nl. = nll + nlh
Ph nhl nhh nh. = nhl + nhh
Children's margins n.l = nll + nhl n.h = nlh + nhh
Figure 1: A 2× 2 mobility table
distributions (therefore the same inequality) in mobility tables X and Y, while
the marginal distribution for children in Y is obtained from X by widening the
income gap, so that the child distribution in X Lorenz dominates that in Y.
Judging the child marginal distributions on static income inequality, one can
say that children's welfare is higher in X than in Y (Atkinson 1970). But how
general are welfare judgments based only on static inequality comparisons?
In tables W and Z of Figure 3 the marginal distributions for parents and
for children are the same as in X and Y, respectively, but with a diﬀerent
association structure between parents' and children's positions. While the
association structures in the tables of Figure 2 are characterised by complete
rigidity, the formations of the social classes in the tables of Figure 3 are
examples of statistical origin independence, characterised by full mixing with
50% of children in each income class coming from poor parents and 50%
coming from rich parents.
Society X Society Y
Children Children
$600 $1000 $400 $1200
Parents
$200 10 0 10
Parents
$200 10 0 10
$600 0 10 10 $600 0 10 10
10 10 10 10
Figure 2: Two tables with diﬀerent static inequality and the same rigidity
Our questionnaire uses examples similar to those shown in these ﬁgures
to study how the welfare that people assign to diﬀerent societies depends on
the extent of income inequality within the children's marginal distribution
and on the strength of intergenerational interdependence between parents'
and children's positions.
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Society W Society Z
Children Children
$600 $1000 $400 $1200
Parents
$200 5 5 10
Parents
$200 5 5 10
$600 5 5 10 $600 5 5 10
10 10 10 10
Figure 3: Two tables with diﬀerent static inequality and origin independence
In analysing a mobility table one has to consider two forms of interdepen-
dence occurring between the distributions P and C: structural mobility refers
to the comparison between parents' and children's marginal distributions of
incomes and is aﬀected by the process of economic growth;9 exchange mo-
bility is only concerned with the process of class transition, namely the degree
to which parents and children change their relative positions between income
classes. The importance of keeping separate these two notions of mobility has
been extensively documented (Rogoﬀ 1953, Duncan 1966, Goldthorpe 1980)
but, from a normative welfare perspective, the distinction between struc-
tural and exchange mobility is more problematic. In particular, while the
distinction between the two is recognised conceptually (Markandya 1982), it
is diﬃcult to decompose their eﬀects in speciﬁc welfare measures (Fields and
Ok 1999, p.565). Welfare studies on intergenerational mobility typically fo-
cus on exchange mobility, while the eﬀect of structural mobility has attracted
less interest.
Here we limit the possible role of structural mobility on welfare judgments
by comparing scenarios where marginal distributions can be diﬀerent for at
most a diﬀerent amount of inequality in the children's generation (as between
X and W, on the one side, and Y and Z, on the other). Moreover, we will
consider scenarios which maintain the simple association structure of the
above examples, namely with a symmetric conﬁguration (that is, nij = nji
for i 6= j) and where both generations of parents and children are divided
evenly between rich and poor (nl. = nh. and n.l = n.h).
10 With the latter
9For example, during an economic expansion, children experience an increase in the
probability of obtaining a higher income than their parents; the opposite occurs during
economic decline. The higher inequality of the children's marginal distributions in tables
Y and Z may then be attributed to the diﬀerent income growth rates of rich and poor
families.
10The two restrictions imply that the associated transition matrices have non-negative
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restrictions the strength of association between parents and children in a
2× 2 mobility table can be measured directly by the mixing parameter m =
1−nii/ni. indicating the proportion of children which change their positions
with respect to their parents.11 In a rigid society such as Figure 2 m = 0; in
a society with full mixing m = 0.5 (Figure 3); partial mixing (some positive
association) has 0 < m < 1/2.12
A change in intergenerational income dependence can have two opposing
eﬀects on welfare: an increase in independence reduces inequality between
dynasties, but it also increases intertemporal ﬂuctuations of incomes within
dynasties (Atkinson 1981). Extending the theory of stochastic dominance to
a multidimensional context, Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982) have shown
that in a dynamic welfare framework which considers only these two eﬀects
of mobility, the social optimum (for a mobility table with ﬁx marginal dis-
tributions) collapses either to a case of complete rigidity or to one with full
reversal.13
An important limitation of this type of framework is that it does not
recognize any special value to the case of full mixing (m = 0.5) although,
from a welfare perspective, this case has been taken as an indicator of equal-
ity of opportunity (Shorrocks 1978, Dardanoni 1993, Gottschalk and Spo-
laore 2002).14 Although the relation between preferences for income mobil-
entries such that both rows and columns sum to unity.
11While the parameter m and similar measures for the strength of intergenerational
association in a mobility table are taken as measures of exchange mobility, they represent
proper measures of the latter concept only when structural mobility is absent  in cases
in which the marginal distributions of parents and children in a mobility table are equal.
This is rarely the case, which is also why is so diﬃcult to separate the two concepts in
welfare analyses.
12Negative association, where 0.5 < m ≤ 1, is only of theoretical interest since real world
mobility data never show complete reversal between parents and children's economic posi-
tions; see Dardanoni et al. (2012) who show that the hypothesis of nonnegative association
cannot be rejected in almost all social mobility tables in 149 diﬀerent countries and time
periods.
13For example, a framework falling in this category is the utilitarian welfare function:
W = 1nΣiΣjU(Pi, Cj)nij . Indeed, for this function Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982) have
shown that when ∂2U(Pi, Pj)/∂Pi∂Cj < (>)0, moving weight oﬀ (on) the diagonal of a
transition matrix, equivalent to reducing (increasing) m in terms of our speciﬁcation, is
welfare improving.
14For example, Shorrocks (1978) developed an axiomatic approach to mobility measure-
ment where an axiom is explicitly introduced which assigns maximum value to transition
matrices (a reduced form of mobility tables; see footnote 8) with the least amount of
predictability. Dardanoni (1993) presents a model where children coming from parents in
lower economic positions receive a higher weight in the social evaluation than those com-
ing from better positioned families: as he restricts attention to tables with non-negative
dependence, it follows that welfare is maximised, ceteris paribus, by mobility tables with
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ity and for income equality has not received great attention in the welfare-
measurement literature, within the general literature on distributive justice,
the issue is a matter of lively debate. There are three main views:
1. The substitution view.15 Origin independence should be the main ob-
jective of a just society and a concern for income inequality should only
receive social concern if partial or complete rigidities cannot be fully
removed. According to this view, in the comparison between X and
Y of Figure 2, X might be socially preferred, since the greater static
inequality for the children marginal distribution in Y is inherited from
parents; but in the comparison between W and Z of Figure 3, Z should
be preferred since now, due to the condition of origin independence,
the greater inequality of the latter table is considered a sign of better
opportunities  a land of opportunities.
2. Priority for the worst oﬀ. Equality of opportunity and of outcome
should be considered on diﬀerent ethical grounds and the degree of
static inequality in a society should always be kept at the minimum
compatible with the maximum level of income for the least well-oﬀ
people (Rawls 1971). Under this approach, X is better than Y in Figure
2 and W is better than Z in Figure 3.
3. Intermediate position. In a well-organized society talents should be
promoted and this requires equality of opportunity. Often this idea is
linked to the role of incentives for economic eﬃciency (Loury 1981), but
in addition there may be fairness considerations that do not imply a
substitution between equality of opportunity and equality of outcome.
One may support the idea that rewards gained by individuals should
be related to their individual desert; but also that income inequality
should be accepted only to the extent it serves such a purpose.
Consider a comparison between X and Z, in addition to those between X and
Y and between W and Z. According to the substitution view, together with
X preferred to Y and Z to W, Z should also be preferred to X. On the other
hand, any theory which values equality but not mobility implies X preferred
to Y, W to Z, and X to Z. Someone who values both mobility and equality
may instead prefer X to Y, W to Z, but Z to X. The latter preferences in
particular signify that there may be an ethic which values both equality of
origin independence. Gottschalk and Spolaore (2002) also develop a framework where
a speciﬁc form of inequality aversion restricted to the children's generation is shown to
induce a strict preference for independence.
15See Field and Ok's (1999) remark about Friedman (1962).
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opportunities and equality of outcomes and which, therefore, entails a trade-
oﬀ between the two notions only in cases where more of one type of equality
necessitates less of the other.16
3 The Approach
Testing whether people value mobility in the abstract and whether is there
a trade-oﬀ in preference for equality and mobility is not simple. Empirical
analyses using ﬁeld data meet the problem that preference can be inferred,
but not directly tested: behaviour in the real world is aﬀected by strate-
gic evaluations, making it problematic to disentangle ethical values from
personal interests. The same problem emerges with experimental investiga-
tions. Studies based on general social surveys have problems investigating
pure distributive principles because of the diﬃculty of maintaining control
over the various conceptual subtleties typically involved in distributional is-
sues. An alternative method, increasingly used in empirical social choice, is
to conduct more focused questionnaires with selected samples of individuals.
We use students as subjects for our questionnaire: they are used to working
with numerical examples and to reasoning about logical propositions. There
is also expectation that they are more open minded and less aﬀected by
prejudices than other categories of people.
Designing a questionnaire presents several challenges. If the questionnaire
tasks are not clearly explained respondents may not answer or may give inac-
curate answers. The same may happen if the questionnaire is uninteresting,
too diﬃcult or too long. A major problem for our design was also that of
ﬁnding an intuitive way to translate the technical notion of mobility tables
in terms of displays accessible to student respondents.17
The main part of the questionnaire consists of eight pair-wise comparisons
designed to investigate whether mobility is considered a desirable social ob-
jective in the abstract. Each comparison presents a pair of scenarios A and
B characterised by diﬀerent income proﬁles as in the examples discussed in
the previous section; we use bus queue pictures (Amiel and Cowell 1999)
to represent the two income groups within each generation of parents and
children; dynasties are identiﬁed by colour  see Figure 4.18 This combines
16There are views that value neither equality nor mobility: according to Nozick (1974),
any inequality that has not been obtained by expropriation or exploitation can be justiﬁed.
17The problem of ﬁnding an intuitive display to represent mobility scenarios in a ques-
tionnaire has been discussed by Bernasconi and Dardanoni (2004, 2005).
18In the example scenario A corresponds to mobility table X of Section 2 B corresponds
to mobility table Z.
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Figure 4: Example of a question display
intuitively information about income inequality within each generation and
intergenerational mobility. Participants were asked to indicate which sce-
nario they considered socially preferable from an impartial position.19
3.1 The structure of the questionnaire
Table 1 summarises the pair-wise comparisons of the questionnaire. For each
scenario the two numbers in round brackets give the ratios between parents'
and children's incomes for the group of poor and rich, respectively: so (2, 2)
means that both the poor group and the rich group double their incomes from
the ﬁx parents' levels of $200 and $600, respectively. All the scenarios of the
questionnaire are based either on (2, 2) or on (3, 1.67). Clearly, the scenarios
using (2, 2) are characterised by a widening of the inequality between the
19Impartial position means that the individual whose preferences are considered is
not directly involved in the distributions of income in the society. This was explained
in the introduction to the questionnaire, which also explained other features, including
the fact that the questionnaire is about social preferences for the distributions of incomes
in hypothetical societies of two generations, the generation of the parents and the gen-
eration of the children; the fact there are diﬀerent dimensions which may be involved
in considering income distributions; the way in which displays have to be looked at and
interpreted. The full questionnaire is available at
http://darp.lse.ac.uk/resources/questionnaires/MobilityQuestionnaireWelfare.pdf
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Table 1: Summary of the mobility scenarios on the questionnaire
Scenario A Scenario B
Question 1 (3, 1.67) (3, 1.67) full mix. v. rigidity
[50%] [0%]
Question 2 (3, 1.67) (2, 2) full mix. v. full mix.+widening
[50%] [50%]
Question 3 (3, 1.67) (2, 2) rigidity v. full mix.+widening
[0%] [50%]
Question 4 (3, 1.67) (3, 1.67) partial mix. v. rigidity
[20%] [0%]
Question 5 (3, 1.67) (2, 2) partial mix. v. partial mix.+widening
[20%] [20%]
Question 6 (3, 1.67) (2, 2) rigidity v. partial mix.+widening
[0%] [20%]
Question 7 (3, 1.67) (3, 1.67) full mix. v. partial mix.
[50%] [20%]
Question 8 (3, 1.67) (2, 2) rigidity v. rigidity+widening
[0%] [0%]
poor and the rich. The number in square brackets is the parameter m of
Section 2: the higher is m the more mixing there is in society and the greater
is the degree of intergenerational mobility. The the questionnaire uses three
values for m: 50% (full mixing), 20% (partial mixing) and 0% (rigidity).
Comparing scenarios with diﬀerent combinations of parameters can be
used to draw inferences on the various principles and ideas discussed above.
Q1 shows two scenarios with the same inequality (no widening), but with
mobility higher in A. Q4 and Q7 have a similar structure, but diﬀerent val-
ues for the mixing parameter. Thus, the three questions can be used to
investigate whether people value mobility as such, namely when mobility
does not interfere with static inequality. The answers to the three questions
will show whether more mobility induces stronger preference. In Q2, Q5 and
Q8, mobility is the same in both scenarios, but there is widening in the B
scenarios; mobility of the scenarios is higher moving from Q2, to Q5 and
Q8. Therefore, the answers to each individual question can be used to in-
fer people attitude towards static income inequality; whereas comparing the
distributions of answers across questions will be used to investigate the sub-
stitution view: whether more mobility induces a lower support for income
equality per se. Q3 and Q6 present scenarios where both mobility and in-
equality are diﬀerent: in Q3, A is a scenario with rigidity and less inequality
than in B, which is characterised by full mixing and widening; Q6 is similar
10
(B has partial mixing). Comparing the distributions of answers between the
two questions can provide evidence on people willingness to sacriﬁce some
income equality in order to obtain more income mobility, an idea that we
have suggested may be consistent with an ethic of meritocracy. Evidence
on the same notion can also be obtained comparing the answers to Q3 and
Q6 with those in Q8, which compares two rigid scenarios and B has more
inequality (widening). By contrast, persistent preferences for A in the three
questions would be consistent with a strict egalitarianism.
3.2 The samples
The questionnaires were completed in 2009 and 2010 by a total of 356 univer-
sity students. They were from the university of Venice (Italy), LSE (UK),
and Ruppin Academic Center (Israel): 120, 89 and 147 participants, respec-
tively. All students were upper-level undergraduates, in most cases with
main training in economics, but with no speciﬁc teaching in the theory of
income mobility. Using as respondents students at about the similar stage in
education but from diﬀerent countries allows one to address the question of
the impact of cultural background on perception and evaluation of mobility.
The questionnaire was administered during lectures or classes. Answering
the full questionnaire required about 20 minutes.
4 Results
Here we present the preferences expressed by participants in the pair-wise
comparisons, focusing on ﬁve major issues.
1. Do people show support for mobility? If a person values mobility
as such then he should choose response A in Q1 (Full Mixing versus Rigid-
ity), Q4 (Partial mixing v rigidity) and Q7 (Full v Partial Mixing). Table 2
reports the answers to the three questions as percentage of each country sub-
sample and in the aggregate (ALL). The second column gives the number of
valid responses for each question and in each country: there were very few
non-responses. In all countries the majority of subjects report a preference
for A in all three questions. A diﬀerence-of-proportion tests (column d -test)
conﬁrms that the diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant in all the compar-
isons. Therefore, we conclude that participants indeed value mobility in all
the three countries. χ2-tests reject the null hypothesis of homogeneity in Q1
and Q4, while homogeneity is accepted in Q7. The results of the tests are
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Table 2: Results in Q1, Q4, Q7
Valid Preference Preference Indif./ d-test χ2-test
resp. for A for B not comp.
Q1 Percentages
Italy 120 60.8% 22.5% 16.7% 4.50∗∗∗ 11.05∗
UK 89 77.5% 7.9% 14.6% 7.00∗∗∗
Israel 147 70.1% 19.7% 10.2% 6.53∗∗∗
ALL 356 68.8% 17.7% 13.5% 10.31 ∗∗∗
Q4
Italy 120 56.7% 31.7% 11.7% 2.82∗∗ 20.64∗∗∗
UK 89 84.3% 7.9% 7.9% 7.40∗∗∗
Israel 146 66.7% 20.4% 12.9% 6.10∗∗∗
ALL 355 67.7% 21.1% 11.0% 9.28 ∗∗∗
Q7
Italy 119 68.3% 22.5% 9.2% 5.17∗∗∗ 4.87
UK 89 68.5% 16.9% 14.6% 5.162∗∗∗
Israel 147 70.1% 15.0% 15.0% 7.33∗∗∗
ALL 356 69.1% 18.0.7% 12.6% 10.28 ∗∗∗
Notes: d-test is a diﬀerence-of-proportion test for H0 : p(A) = p(B), based
on the standard normal approximation of the binomial distribution. χ2-test
is for the null hypothesis that answers in Italy, UK, and Israel can be viewed
as if drawn from the same population. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗, denote rejection at, 10%, 5%,
and 1% signiﬁcance levels.
consistent with the evidence that in Q1 and in Q4, there are higher propor-
tions of choices for A, hence stronger preferences for mobility, in UK than
in Israel and in Italy. This interesting piece of evidence will be examined in
more detail studying the eﬀect of personal factors.
2. Does more mobility elicit stronger preference? A second issue can
be addressed by comparing the answers to Q1, Q4 and Q7: whether more
mobility induces stronger preferences or whether preferences for mobility does
not depend on the degree of mobility. In the former case, we should expect
that the proportions of choice for A in Q1 are higher than in both Q4 and Q7.
We do not see any such systematic tendency: looking at simple percentages,
A in Q1 is chosen more often than A in Q4 in Italy and Israel, but not in UK;
and it is chosen more often than A in Q7 in UK, but not in Italy nor Israel
(where A is Q1 is chosen as often as in Q7). To obtain further evidence on the
issue, Table 3 shows the bivariate distributions of preferences expressed by
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participants in (Q1,Q4) and (Q1,Q7). Since we did not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant
diﬀerence over the pairs across samples, here the reported percentages are
for the full data set of the three countries. The percentages conﬁrm that
the majority of participants choosing A in Q1, also chose A in Q4 and Q7.
In particular, the proportions of answers of category (A,A) are 53.8% and
54.1% in (Q1,Q4) and (Q1,Q7), respectively; moreover, the percentages for
the other categories do not show any tendency to switch from A to B (or to
indiﬀerence) between Q1 and Q4 and Q7.
Table 3: Distributions of answers in (Q1,Q4) and (Q1,Q7)
Q4 Q7
A B Indiﬀ. A B Indiﬀ.
Q1 A 53.8% 10.4% 4.5% Q1 A 54.1% 9.3% 5.6%
B 7.6% 8.5% 1.7% B 7.6% 7.3% 2.5%
Indiﬀ. 6.5% 2.3% 4.8% Indiﬀ. 7.6% 1.4% 4.5%
3. Do people show support for income equality? Questionnaire ex-
periments have been used before to investigate preferences for equality:20 the
diﬀerence here is that preference for static equality may conﬂict with prefer-
ence for mobility. In our questionnaire a person who values equality should
choose response A in Q2 (Full mixing and widening), Q5 (Partial mixing and
widening) and Q8 (Rigidity v simple widening). The answers to the three
questions reported in Table 4 show that in all three countries the majority of
subjects do indeed value equality (they prefer A). Moreover, the diﬀerences in
proportion between preferences for A and for B are highly signiﬁcant (d -test)
and the patterns are homogeneous across the three countries (χ2-test).
4 Does mobility preference reduce support for equality? A person
with the substitution view should switch preferences from A to B going
from Q8 (zero mobility) to Q5 (partial mobility) and to Q2 (perfect mobility,
where the B response should be strictly preferred). So the large proportion
of A preferences for all three questions in Table 4 suggests that a majority
20In general, previous questionnaires conducted to investigate people's attitude towards
income inequality took the form of a test of the classical Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers
(Amiel and Cowell 1992; Amiel and Cowell 1998, Harrison and Seidl 1994, Bernasconi
2002, Traub and Schmidt 2009). Support for the principle depends on the range of the
income distribution in which income transfers occur, on the type of verbal or numerical
test conducted, on the frames adopted to test it (e.g. whether from a external observer
viewpoint, under a condition similar to the veil of ignorance, or under one of individual
risk)  Amiel (1999), Gaertner and Schokkaert (2012).
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Table 4: Results in Q2, Q5, Q8
Valid Preference Preference Indif./ d-test χ2-test
resp. for A for B not comp.
Q2 Percentages
Italy 120 67.5% 16.7% 15.8% 5.97∗∗∗ 2.64
UK 89 76.4% 14.6% 9.0% 6.00∗∗∗
Israel 147 71.4% 16.3% 12.2% 7.22∗∗∗
ALL 356 71.3% 16.0% 12.6% 11.11 ∗∗∗
Q5
Italy 120 68.3% 15.8% 15.8% 6.17∗∗∗ 2.66
UK 89 77.5% 13.5% 9.0% 6.21∗∗∗
Israel 147 72.8% 14.3% 12.9% 7.69∗∗∗
ALL 356 72.5% 14.6% 12.9% 11.64 ∗∗∗
Q8
Italy 120 70.8% 13.3% 15.8% 6.76∗∗∗ 4.47
UK 88 80.9% 10.1% 9.0% 6.89∗∗∗
Israel 147 78.9% 10.2% 10.9% 8.91∗∗∗
ALL 355 76.7% 11.2% 11.8% 13.11 ∗∗∗
of respondents reject the substitution view; however, there is a moderate
tendency of the frequencies of B answers to increase moving from Q8, to Q5
and to Q2 in all the three samples. The diﬀerence-of-proportions test reveals
some low signiﬁcance only in the aggregate data for the diﬀerence between Q8
and Q2 (with the proportions of B answers increasing from 11.2% to 16.0%,
d = 1.625, one-tailed p < 10%), but not between Q8 and Q5, nor between
Q5 and Q2. Table 5 shows the joint distributions of choices over (Q2,Q5),
(Q2,Q8) and (Q5,Q8) which strengthen the evidence that the majority of
subjects chose (A,A) over all the three pairs of questions, but conﬁrm the
moderate tendency of switching preferences from A to B in going from Q8
to Q2 and Q5.21 The substitution view is rejected by the majority, but may
hold for a small minority of respondents.
21This can be veriﬁed comparing the proportions of answers of type (B,A) in (Q2,Q8)
and (Q5,Q8), with those of type (A,B) which are consistent with an opposite tendency.
While the proportions of the latter patterns are very small, the former are larger, with
diﬀerences that are statistically signiﬁcant. In particular, in (Q2,Q8) the proportion of
answers (B,A) is 8.5% (30/355) and those of type (A,B) is 3.7% (13/355) (d = 2.76, one-
tailed p < 1%); in (Q5,Q8) the answers (B,A) are 5.9% (21/355) and those of type (A,B)
is 2.3% (8/355) (d = 2.6, one-tailed p < 1%). Instead, there is no signiﬁcance diﬀerence
in the frequencies of (A,B) and (B,A) answers in (Q2,Q5).
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Table 5: Distributions of answers in (Q2,Q5), (Q2,Q8), (Q5,Q8)
Q5 Q8
A B Indiﬀ. A B Indiﬀ.
Q2 A 62.1% 5.3% 3.4% Q2 A 63.4% 3.7% 4.2%
B 5.9% 7.0% 3.1% B 8.5% 5.6% 2.0%
Indiﬀ. 4.5% 2.3% 5.9% Indiﬀ. 5.1% 2.0% 5.6%
Q8 A 65.6% 2.25% 4.5%
B 5.9% 6.8% 2.0%
Indiﬀ. 5.4% 2.3% 5.4%
5 Are people willing to sacriﬁce some equality for more mobil-
ity? The acceptance of an equality-mobility trade-oﬀ may arise when some
inequality is necessary for greater mobility, as in a meritocracy. The an-
swers to Q3 (Rigidity v Mixing+Widening), Q6 (Rigidity v Partial Mix-
ing+Widening), and Q8 (Rigidity v Simple widening) provide evidence here.
The results are consistent with the trade-oﬀ if response B in Q3 is chosen
more often than in Q6, which in turn is chosen more often than in Q8.22 The
evidence in Table 6 is consistent with the trade-oﬀ: in all three samples, the
response A decreases, while response B increases sharply moving from Q8 to
Q6 and then to Q3. The diﬀerence of proportions of response B between the
three questions are highly signiﬁcant.23 It is also interesting to remark that,
while in Q8 and Q3 the majority of responses are for A (see the d-test), in
Q3 (where there is full mixing in B) choices are divided evenly between A
and B. The preference patterns are similar across countries (χ2-test).
The trade-oﬀ evidence is supported by the joint distributions over (Q3,Q6),
(Q3,Q8) and (Q6,Q8) in Table 7: while in all the three pairs the relative ma-
jorities of choices are for (A,A), there are also a substantial proportion of
(B,A) responses.24 Moreover, in (Q3,Q6) more than a quarter of the respon-
22An alternative hypothesis here is that people do not switch preferences between the
three questions, and in particular that they choose in Q3 and Q6 the same scenario A as
in Q8. For example, a prediction of no trade-oﬀ would hold either for individuals who
do not care about mobility, or for those who consider the greater inequality of scenario
B in the three questions anyhow too high to be compensated for any amount of mobility
(even when mobility is perfect as in B of Q3).
23For the aggregate sample the increases in response B are: +23.2% (35.4%-
11.2%=126/353-40/355) between Q6 and Q8 (d = 6.597, one-tailed p < 1%); +39.0%
(49.2%-11.2%=159/356-40/355) between Q3 and Q8 (d = 8.365, one-tailed p < 1%);
+13.8% (49.2%-35.4%=159/356-126/353) between Q3 and Q6 (d = 1.896, one-tailed
p < 5%);
24As above, in order to determinate the statistical signiﬁcance of patterns (BA), they
can be contrasted with the symmetric patterns (A,B). The comparison show that: in
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Table 6: Results in Q3, Q6, Q8
Valid Preference Preference Indif. d-test χ2-test
resp. for A for B not comp.
Q3 Percentages
Italy 119 45.0% 49.2% 5.8% -0.56 3.19
UK 89 50.6% 40.4% 9.0% 0.89
Israel 147 46.9% 43.5% 9.5% 0.52
ALL 355 47.2% 44.7% 7.9% 0.44
Q6
Italy 118 54.2% 35.8% 10.0% 2.02∗ 0.41
UK 88 57.3% 34.8% 7.9% 2.10∗
Israel 147 55.8% 35.4% 8.8% 2.68∗
ALL 353 55.6% 35.4% 8.1% 3.94 ∗∗∗
Q8
Italy 120 70.8% 13.3% 15.8% 6.76∗∗∗ 4.47
UK 88 80.9% 10.1% 9.0% 6.89∗∗∗
Israel 147 78.9% 10.2% 10.9% 8.91∗∗∗
ALL 355 76.7% 11.2% 11.8% 13.11 ∗∗∗
dents choose (B,B), the scenarios with more mobility.
5 The role of personal factors
It is potentially interesting to know the personal traits that appear to pre-
dispose respondents to certain choices. Table 8 reports the actual personal
information from the end of the questionnaire. In general we do not observe
large diﬀerences in the average answers across the three country subsamples.
One important diﬀerence is that, while all students in Israel and the major-
ity in Italy are from their respective country, most students in UK are from
abroad (A3). In all countries, most respondents perceive that their family
income is high (F1) and just above the country average (F2) and the majority
believe that they will improve their parents' economic (P1) and social posi-
tions (P2). When faced with values often attached to mobility, respondents
generally agree that independence between parents' and children's income
is a desirable property for society (V1) and that income independence is a
(Q3,Q6), category (B,A) corresponds to 15.6% (55/352) versus 7.7% (27/352) of (A,B)
(d = 3.20, one-tailed p < 1%); in (Q3,Q8) answers (BA) are 31.9% (113/354) and those
(A,B) are 3.1% (8/354) (d = 9.25, one-tailed p < 1%); in (Q6,Q8), (BA) count for 22.1%
(78/352) and (A,B) for 3.7% (13/352) (d = 6.92, one-tailed p < 1%).
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Table 7: Distributions of answers in (Q3,Q6), (Q3,Q8), (Q6,Q8)
Q6 Q8
A B Indiﬀ. A B Indiﬀ.
Q3 A 37.2% 7.7% 2.6% Q3 A 39.6% 3.1% 4.5%
B 15.6% 25.6% 3.4% B 31.9% 6.5% 6.5%
Indiﬀ. 3.1% 2.3% 5.4% Indiﬀ. 5.7% 1.4% 0.9%
Q8 A 48.6% 3.7% 3.7%
B 22.2% 6.8% 6.8%
Indiﬀ. 6.5% 0.6% 1.1%
sign of equality of opportunities (V2). There is slightly less clear evidence
whether the majority support the view that the government's main duty to
ensure equality of opportunities or rather that of reducing as much as possi-
ble income inequality (V3): on this issue respondents are typically half way
between the extremes.
We constructed two individual preference indices: for any respondent
mobility preference is the number of A responses on Q1, Q4 and Q7; for any
respondent equality preference is the number of A responses on Q2, Q5 and
Q8. Table 9 shows the distributions of the variables across the four possible
categories of response and conﬁrms that the majority of respondents value
both mobility and equality: for both variables, there are very few 0A; for
mobility preference category 3A is the most favoured (although there are
diﬀerences in pattern across the subsamples); equality preference category
3A commands an absolute majority in all the three subsamples. Table 5
presents the results of three speciﬁcations of an ordered probit regressions
for each of the two preference variables with the personal factors of Table 9
as independent variables.
In the baseline mobility-preference regression only V1 (independence of
parents and children's income in society) is signiﬁcant: as one would ex-
pect, those who agree that independence is desirable value mobility higher;
but we do not see any eﬀect on mobility preference from the role of indepen-
dence as equality of opportunities (V2) nor of the view regarding whether the
government should provide equality of opportunities or reduce income dif-
ferences (V3). In the baseline equality-preference regression family income
has a positive eﬀect, which may be consistent with an altruistic attitude
of those perceiving themselves as better-oﬀ. Also, participants perceiving
better prospects of moving upwards in the social parade are less inclined to
value income equality higher than those who perceive to have lower prospects
(P2). This result may be consistent with arguments sometimes used in the
political economic literature to explain why the poor do not always support
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Table 8: Sample characteristics
Italy UK Israel All
Number of respondents 120 89 147 356
Personal attributes
A1. Age 20.1 21.0 24.6 22.5
A2. Gender (0 male, 1 female) 0.54 0.40 0.46 0.47
A3. Nationality (1 if from country; 0 otherwise) 0.93 0.27 1.00 0.80
Family attributes
F1. Family income (1 very low; ...; 5 very high) 2.9 3.4 3.2 3.2
F5. Family income relative to country average 3.2 3.7 3.4 3.4
(1 much lower;...; 5 much higher)
Prospects
P1. Prospective income relative to parental income (1
much lower;...; 5 much higher)
3.4 4.0 3.9 3.8
P2. Prospective social position relative to parental posi-
tion (1 much lower;...; 5 much higher)
3.5 3.7 3.7 3.6
Values
V1. Is independence of parents' and children's income
levels desirable? (1 strongly agree;..; 5 strongly disagree)
2.3 2.0 2.2 2.2
V2. Is independence of parents' and children's income
levels equivalent to equality of opportunity?
2.2 1.9 1.8 1.9
(1 strongly agree;...; 5 strongly disagree)
V3. Should the government: a. provide equality of op-
portunity and not alter economic outcomes; or b. reduce
income diﬀerences as much as possible?
4.8 3.5 5.2 4.6
(1 strongly agree with a.; 10 strongly agree with b.)
real world redistributive policy if they perceive that they can be in a better
economic position in the future (Benabou and Ok 2001), but there may also
be some deeper factors weakening preferences for income equality, indepen-
dent of material interest.25 The regression also shows that participants who
value equality higher seem those who agree that government should care to
equality of opportunities more than to equality of income (V3). The eﬀect
is small, but opposite to that expected by the substitution view.
The second regression uses country dummies (Israel is the base case).
The results for mobility preference show a negative impact of the dummy
25Supporting this interpretation note the negative eﬀect of prospect on social position
(P2) rather than the prospect on income (P1), which also has a negative eﬀect. Removing
P2 from the regression makes P1 not signiﬁcant.
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Table 9: Mobility and equality preferences - distributions by category
0A 1A 2A 3A 0A 1A 2A 3A
Mobility preference Equality preference
Italy 10.8 24.2 33.3 31.7 16.7 10.0 23.3 50.0
UK 9.0 11.2 20.2 59.6 13.5 6.7 11.2 68.5
Israel 10.9 16.3 27.9 44.9 9.5 14.3 19.7 56.5
ALL 10.4 17.7 27.8 44.1 12.9 11.0 18.8 57.3
for Italy but there are no eﬀects of the country dummy in the regression
on equality preference. The results are perhaps not totally unexpected. For
example, there is a very large literature indicating that Southern European
cultures, and Italy in particular, are characterised by very strong family ties
with various socioeconomic implications.26 For example, among other things,
they imply a tendency of individuals in these societies to rely on various forms
of social insurance provided within the family which reduce social mobility.
Also note that all respondents are students, who in Italy and Israel are mainly
from their respective country, whereas in UK are mainly from abroad (Table
8).
The third regression includes a nationality dummy. This is constructed
from the response to question 3 (Do you consider yourself ...? + multiple
nationality categories); in eﬀect it is coded as though the question were
do you consider yourself from round here? taking value 1 (Yes) or 0
(No). This is negative and highly signiﬁcant for the mobility-preference
regression but not for the equality-preference regression. Those who have
literally moved from overseas to study are more likely to be in favour of
mobility; but they are no more likely to be in favour of equality than their
peers.
6 Concluding remarks
Do people value mobility? Clearly, yes. Is mobility enough? Clearly, no.
According to our respondents, if there is greater mobility in society then that
is a good thing; but it does not meant that you can forget about equality
(Table 5). The evidence shows that the majority of our respondents value
positively both mobility and equality: not only do they reject the extreme
position that treats income equality as the only mandatory welfare objective,
26See Esping-Andersen (1999) on the socioeconomic impact of diﬀerent types of family
organizations in post-industrial societies and Checchi et al. (1999) on intergenerational
income mobility in Italy.
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Table 10: Ordered probit for the role of personal factors
Baseline regression
Mobility preference Equality preference
A1. Age 0.0062 (0.025) 0.0440 (0.027)
A2. Gender -0.1638 (0.1257) -0.1005 (0.131)
F1. Family income 0.0271 (0.117) 0.2514∗∗ (0.125)
F2. Living standard -0.0311 (0.111) -0.0879 (0.117)
P1. Prospect on income 0.0212 (0.093) 0.0368 (0.099)
P2. Prospect. on soc.
position
-0.0349 (0.103) -0.2068∗ (0.109)
V1. Indep. desirable -0.3152∗∗∗ (0.077) -0.0130 (0.081)
V2. Indep. as equ. of
opport.
-0.1148 (0.081) 0.0114 (0.085)
V3. Equ. opport. v. equ.
income
0.0102 (0.026) -0.0655∗∗ (0.028)
Regression with country dummies
Mobility preference Equality preference
A1. Age -0.0164 (0.030) 0.0537 (0.032)
A2. Gender -0.1607 (0.126) -0.0960 (0.132)
F1. Family income -0.0147 (0.119) 0.2566∗∗ (0.127)
F2. Living standard -0.0675 (0.113) -0.0782 (0.188)
P1. Prospect on income -0.0743 (0.100) 0.0499 (0.106)
P2. Prospect. on soc.
position
-0.0172 (0.103) -0.2077∗ (0.109)
V1. Indep. desirable -0.3201∗∗∗ (0.077) -0.0135 (0.081)
V2. Indep. as equ. of
opport.
-0.0892 (0.081) 0.0050 (0.086)
V3. Equ. opport. v. equ.
income
0.0125 (0.026) -0.0648∗∗ (0.028)
Italy -0.3782∗∗ (0.173) 0.0896 (0.183)
UK 0.1636 (0.290) 0.1115 (0.296)
Regression with nationality
Mobility preference Equality preference
A1. Age 0.0245 (0.036) 0.0784∗ (0.039)
A2. Gender -0.1267 (0.127) -0.0729 (0.134)
A3. Nationality -0.4599∗∗ (0.212) -0.2549 (0.224)
F1. Family income -0.0081 (0.119) 0.2592∗∗ (0.127)
F2. Living standard -0.0883 (0.113) -0.0873 (0.118)
P1. Prospect on income -0.0671 (0.101) 0.0524 (0.106)
P2. Prospect. on soc.
position
-0.0162 (0.104) -0.2086∗ (0.110)
V1. Indep. desirable -0.3220∗∗∗ (0.077) -0.0102 (0.081)
V2. Indep. as equ. of
opport.
-0.1050 (0.081) 0.0033 (0.086)
V3. Equ. opport. v. equ.
income
0.0214 (0.027) -0.0605∗∗ (0.028)
Italy -0.1226 (0.209) 0.2367 (0.224)
UK 0.4862 (0.326) 0.2940 (0.337)
Legend: Standard errors in brackets. Stars ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗, denote rejection at, 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
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they also reject the position that considers income mobility as a primary
social goal with income equality representing only a concern when the ﬁrst
objective cannot be fully achieved.
Why do people value mobility? When mobility is accompanied by income
growth then they are prepared to sacriﬁce equality: this is evident from
Table 6. Respondents express willingness to sacriﬁce some income equality
to obtain more income mobility (or vice-versa) only when this is necessary,
but not otherwise. So there is no direct trade-oﬀ in preferences between
income mobility and income equality, but only an indirect trade-oﬀ involving
eﬃciency.
We found no evidence of personal factors that have both a positive ef-
fect in the evaluation of mobility and a negative eﬀect on the evaluation of
income equality (or vice-versa). Family income aﬀects preferences for equal-
ity positively, while a prospect of social improvement aﬀect them negatively.
Mobility is valued highly by those participants who have experienced it 
those who have moved to attend their course of study. There is some evi-
dence of cross country diﬀerences in the evaluation of mobility: respondents
in Italy value it the least; those in the UK value it the most.
Investigating values concerning intergenerational mobility presents a chal-
lenge because of the multidimensional nature of mobility and because individ-
uals' responses in real-world contexts may be motivated by personal interest.
The questionnaire approach to elicitation allows one to make the inequality-
mobility tradeoﬀ precise through a series of linked pair-wise comparisons.
Further development of this approach on a larger scale may throw light on
the important policy questions of how far income mobility is good for soci-
ety and how far income inequality may be accepted in society when this is
necessary to have more mobility.
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